University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

2013

Employment effects of army service and veterans' compensation: evidence
from the Australian Vietnam-era conscription lotteries
Peter Siminski
University of Wollongong, siminski@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Siminski, Peter, "Employment effects of army service and veterans' compensation: evidence from the
Australian Vietnam-era conscription lotteries" (2013). Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive). 163.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/163

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Employment effects of army service and veterans' compensation: evidence from
the Australian Vietnam-era conscription lotteries
Abstract
Exploiting Australia's National Service lotteries of 1965 to 1972, I estimate the effect of army service on
employment outcomes. Population data from military personnel records, tax returns, veterans'
compensation records, and the Census facilitate a rich and precise analysis, identified by 53,000
complying conscripts. The estimated employment effect is -12 percentage points (95% CI: -13, -11)
overall, -37 for those who served in Vietnam and 0 for those who served only in Australia. It emerged in
the 1990s, mirrored by veterans' disability pension effects. These results contrast with those for the
United States, possibly reflecting employment disincentives associated with Australia's veterans'
compensation system.

Keywords
evidence, lotteries, compensation, army, veterans, service, effects, employment, conscription, era,
vietnam, australian, ERA2015

Disciplines
Business

Publication Details
Siminski, P. (2013). Employment effects of army service and veterans' compensation: evidence from the
Australian Vietnam-era conscription lotteries. Review Of Economics And Statistics, 95 (1), 87-97.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/163

EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF ARMY SERVICE AND VETERANS’
COMPENSATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN VIETNAM-ERA
CONSCRIPTION LOTTERIES
Peter Siminski*
Abstract—Exploiting Australia’s National Service lotteries of 1965 to
1972, I estimate the effect of army service on employment outcomes.
Population data from military personnel records, tax returns, veterans’
compensation records, and the Census facilitate a rich and precise analysis, identified by 53,000 complying conscripts. The estimated employment effect is 12 percentage points (95% CI: 13, 11) overall, 37
for those who served in Vietnam and 0 for those who served only in Australia. It emerged in the 1990s, mirrored by veterans’ disability pension
effects. These results contrast with those for the United States, possibly
reflecting employment disincentives associated with Australia’s veterans’
compensation system.

I.

Introduction

T

HE human and financial costs of war can be large and
are hence of considerable policy importance (Bedard &
Olivier, 2006; Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008). One aspect of this is
the effect of military service on subsequent outcomes for
veterans. In the case of the Vietnam War, many studies have
considered effects on health and longevity (see Angrist,
Chen, & Frendsen, 2010; Conley & Heerwig, 2009; Dobkin
& Shabani, 2009; Hearst, Newman, & Hulley, 1986). Other
studies have considered effects on human capital and earnings (Angrist, 1990, 1993; Angrist & Chen, 2011).
The direct effects of military service may be accompanied by indirect effects, through the channel of government
programs for veterans. As the majority of Vietnam veterans
approach retirement age, attention has shifted recently to
the potential work disincentives associated with veterans’
compensation (VC) (Angrist et al., 2010; Autor & Duggan,
2007; Autor, Duggan, & Lyle, 2011; Duggan, Rosenheck,
& Singleton, 2010). In particular, the individual unemployability (IU) aspect of VC seems likely to act as a work disincentive (Angrist et al., 2010; Autor & Duggan, 2008).1
However, there is little evidence of significant causal
employment effects (Angrist et al., 2010; Angrist, Chen, &
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1
See Angrist et al. (2010) and Autor and Duggan (2008) for details of
the U.S. VC system, including individual unemployability.

Song, 2011; Duggan et al., 2010), except among low-skill
veterans (Angrist et al., 2010). Perhaps the work disincentives in the U.S. VC system are not as substantial as they
appear.
In this paper, I contribute to this literature by estimating
employment effects for Australian Vietnam veterans, for
whom compensation rates are much more fundamentally
tied to employability. The Australian veterans’ compensation system is similar in some ways to the U.S. system.
Compensation includes cash payments and enhanced health
insurance. These payments are notionally tied to the level
of incapacity (on a scale from 0 to 100%). However, veterans who are determined to be totally and permanently incapacitated receive the disability pension special rate (DPSR), which is almost three times larger than the highest rate
of general compensation.2 This is not the case in the United
States, where the VC payment rate for veterans with an IU
determination is no greater than the highest rate for those
who can work. In both countries, veterans can combine this
compensation with income support. In Australia, the implicit (net) replacement rate of DP-SR plus income support is
at least 64% (69%) for a coupled (single) veteran with average earnings and existing eligibility for the 100% general
rate of compensation. Once granted, the payments continue
until death. By 2009, about half of Australian Vietnam
veterans were receiving DP-SR, almost all of whom began
receiving it after 1990.
For identification of employment effects, I exploit Australia’s conscription lotteries held between 1965 and 1972.
Sixteen lotteries were held, each pertaining to a six-month
birth cohort of 20-year-old men. Over 800,000 men registered for the ballots; 64,000 were enlisted in national service, including over 19,000 who served in Vietnam (see
Langford, 1997, for an account of the system; see also Ville
& Siminski, 2011). For research purposes, these lotteries
have several advantages over the corresponding U.S. lotteries. First, the effect of service in Vietnam can be differentiated from service confined to Australia due to large differences between cohorts in the probability of Vietnam
service. In particular, nobody from the final four cohorts
served in Vietnam. Second, there was no GI Bill in Australia, and little or no effect of ballot outcome on educational
attainment. This simplifies the interpretation of the results.
2
The DVA disability pension is the Australian equivalent of U.S. disability compensation. The DP-SR is received almost exclusively by veterans who are determined to be totally and permanently incapacitated.
These veterans cannot work more than eight hours per week, but in practice most do not work at all. There is also an intermediate rate, which lies
between the DP-SR rate and the 100% general rate, but few veterans
receive the intermediate rate.
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Third, the dates of birth (DOBs) drawn were not published
until 1997, so there is no risk of discrimination by employers on the basis of ballot eligibility. Fourth, draft eligibility
was determined immediately at the time of a ballot drawing.
In the United States, there were long delays between assignment of random sequence numbers and draft eligibility
determination, potentially influencing behavior in the
interim, either to avoid the draft or in anticipation of being
drafted. Fifth, Australia’s casualty rates in Vietnam were
considerably lower than those for the United States. This
reduces the threat of bias due to attrition. It also reduces the
likely magnitude of a health mechanism in the effect of
army service on employment. Finally, I am able to show
evidence of some external validity beyond the set of compliers who identify the estimates. (For discussions of the
limitations of the U.S. lotteries, see Angrist, 1990; Angrist,
Imbens, & Rubin, 1996; Angrist & Imbens, 1997; Heckman, 1997; Keane, 2010; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 2000.)
Apart from our own work on mortality (Siminski & Ville,
2011, 2012), no previous studies have used the Australian
conscription lotteries for identification. This is probably
due to a paucity of data. However, in 2006, DOB’s were
collected in the Australian Census of Population and Housing for the first time. The Australian Tax Office also has
granted access to personal income tax return data. I combine these with military personnel records, administrative
veterans’ compensation records, and published contemporaneous population aggregates to construct unit record population data for both the first- and second-stage regressions.
As pioneered by Angrist (1990), I use a two-sample IV
approach and thus have no need to link the data sources. In
practice, however, I use the computationally simpler twosample 2SLS procedure (Inoue & Solon, 2010).
I find a very large employment effect (12 percentage
points) in 2006, when most compliers were in their late 50s.
However, this is completely driven by conscripts who
served in Vietnam, for whom the effect is precisely estimated at 37 percentage points. The effect is relatively
recent, emerging gradually since the mid-1990s. I also find
a corresponding trend in disability pension effects that largely mirror the employment effects but are even larger. I
discuss several factors that may have contributed to these
striking results, focusing on the possible role of the Australian veterans’ compensation system.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the estimation strategy. Section III discusses
the sources of data. The results are presented in section IV,
and section V concludes. In the appendix, I discuss the
validity of the exclusion restriction. Appendix B (online)
provides a descriptive summary of trends in the DVA disability pension.
II.

Estimation Strategy

The primary aim is to estimate the effects of Vietnam-era
army service (r) and army service in Vietnam (v) on the

probability that person i is employed in 2006 (y).3 These
binary indicators (r and v) are not mutually exclusive. In
particular, v ¼ 1 implies r ¼ 1. In the main specification, br
is the effect of army service in Australia, and bv is the additional effect of serving in Vietnam:
yi ¼ a þ br ri þ bv vi þ c0 Ci þ li :

ð1Þ

C is a vector of fifteen binary indicators representing sixmonth birth cohorts. r is likely to be correlated with l,
because medical screening of potential army entrants is
highly selective and because men who seek out army service may differ from those who do not. Selection for service
in Vietnam also was nonrandom, so v is likely to be correlated with l. Thus, OLS estimation of equation (1) may not
uncover the causal effects of service. To solve the problem
of selection bias, I construct instruments that exploit the
random assignment of the conscription lotteries. A single
ballot outcome dummy (z) is a plausibly valid instrument.
However, the effects of ballot outcome vary by cohort, so a
more efficient strategy is to interact z with C. Let Z be a
vector of sixteen binary instruments, representing the ballot
outcome in each cohort, respectively.4 The two first-stage
regressions are identified by the exclusion of Z from equation (1), along with considerable differences between
cohorts in the proportion of conscripts sent to Vietnam. The
first-stage regressions are
ri ¼ pr0 þ pr1 0 Zi þ pr2 0 Ci þ eri ;

ð2Þ

vi ¼ pv0 þ pv1 0 Zi þ pv2 0 Ci þ evi :

ð3Þ

Using a two-sample 2SLS procedure (Inoue & Solon,
2010), I estimate the first-stage regressions (2) and (3) by
OLS with one data set and the second-stage regression,
equation (1), with a different data set by OLS, after replacing r and v with the fitted values from equations (2) and
(3). That is, I use cross-sample fitted values of r and v. The
first-stage coefficients come from population data and
therefore are treated as known. For simplicity, I do not
introduce heterogeneous treatment-effect notation, but I do
note that the effect of army service may vary between individuals and subpopulations. This approach estimates the
average effects for men induced by the ballot outcome to
enlist in the army (balloted-in compliers). In general, compliers cannot be individually identified (Angrist et al.,
3
National service was in the army. In my preliminary analysis, I confirmed that the ballot outcome did not induce any men into other branches
of the armed forces. The results are virtually unchanged (but slightly less
precise) if army service is replaced with military service.
4
The term ballot outcome refers to the outcome of the main conscription ballots. z ¼ 1 for men ‘‘balloted-in’’ and 0 for men ‘‘balloted-out’’. A
man is considered to be balloted-in if his DOB was drawn in the ballot
held for his birth cohort. A separate set of ballots was conducted for the
presumably small number of men who were out of the country at the time
of their main ballot (Langford, 1997). This is not a complication, because
each ballot was independent and hence orthogonal, so the outcome of the
main ballot was irrelevant for those who were temporarily absent.
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1996). However, in this case, balloted-in army compliers
are a majority subset (84%) of national servicemen.5
I also show the results from specifications that include
only one of the endogenous variables, including estimates
for each individual cohort using a set of just-identified models. In such models, the coefficients of r and v have different interpretations, discussed in the section IV. The analysis
is also repeated for alternate dependent variables, including
employment in other years and receipt of the veterans’ disability pension.
The model is then extended by interacting v with p,
which represents age eligibility for a veterans’ age pension
(p ¼ 0 if age < 60 years, 1 otherwise).6 Subject to a means
test, veterans with qualifying service (which essentially
equates with service in Vietnam for the study population)
are eligible for this pension from 60 years of age. Eligibility
for the otherwise equivalent social security age pension
commences at the age of 65. Age pension eligibility may
encourage early retirement due to both the income and substitution effects associated with pension means tests (Autor &
Duggan, 2007), and so bp is hypothesized to be negative:
yi ¼ a þ br ri þ bv vi þ bp vi pi þ c0 Ci þ li :

ð4Þ

Finally, I add a proxy for combat intensity (x), based on
within-cohort ratios of deaths in Vietnam to counts of men
who served there (rescaled to have a mean of 0 and a range
of 1). Since this is relevant only for those who served in
Vietnam, it is interacted with v:7
yi ¼ a þ br ri þ bv vi þ bp vi pi þ bx vi xi þ c0 Ci þ li

ð5Þ

bx represents the additional effect on employment of service
in Vietnam for men whose cohort experienced the greatest
combat intensity, relative to the cohort with the lowest combat intensity.
I hypothesize that combat intensity will be associated
with detrimental employment effects, and thus bx should be
negative. However, I have limited confidence in the reliability of this proxy, as discussed in the sections that follow.
5
National servicemen are essentially the set of conscripts (although
some men volunteered for national service). They are often identifiable in
administrative data. They constitute a minority (30.9%) of Australia’s
military personnel who served in Vietnam, or 44.6% of army personnel
who served in Vietnam. Unlike in the United States, there was no apparent incentive for balloted-in men to volunteer for service in the regular
army, so balloted-in compliers are a subset of national servicemen. However, not all national servicemen are compliers. These include men who
were absent from Australia when their age group was required to register
and were subject to the separate, later ballots; men who failed to register
for the ballots and were hence automatically considered for national service call-up; national service volunteers; and men who would have volunteered subsequently had they not been conscripted. Such men were not
induced into the army by the ballot outcome and hence do not contribute
to the identification of the estimates.
6
Officially known as service pension (age). I use the term veterans’
age pension since it is virtually identical to the civilian age pension and to
avoid confusion with service pension (invalidity), which is distinct.
7
Since p and x vary only between cohorts, their main effects are already
included in C.
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The exclusion of z from the employment equation is valid
if its only effect on employment outcomes is through inducement of army service. In the appendix, I consider several
hypothesized violations of this condition in relation to
draft-avoidance behavior but conclude that these are not a
major concern.
III.

Data

For the first- and second-stage regressions, a number of
databases were constructed from various sources, as described
below.
A. First-Stage Database

For the first stage, the population consists of men born
between 1945 and 1952 who were Australian residents
when they turned 20 years old. Military personnel unit
records were obtained from two sources: the Nominal Roll
of Vietnam Veterans (NRVV) from the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) and the Vietnam-era database
(VED) from the Australian Institute of Health & Welfare
(AIHW). Both contain DOBs.
The NRVV is believed to be of very high quality and
contains records for all Vietnam veterans. Over several decades, the DVA has made a concerted effort to complete and
refine its contents. However, personnel who did not serve in
Vietnam are not included in the NRVV.
The VED contains records for all military personnel who
served during the Vietnam War era. It is used for data on
men who served during the era but not in Vietnam. The
VED has been used and refined by the AIHW and DVA for
various health and mortality studies for nearly three decades. The VED version used in this study was also used by
Wilson, Horsley, and van der Hoek (2005). While successive modifications to the database are not well documented,
the original source was a database from the Central Army
Records Office of ‘‘all Vietnam Veterans and non-veterans
who served during the Vietnam conflict era’’ (AIHW, 1992,
p. 98). The estimated number of compliers and their distribution between cohorts (see the first-stage results in section
IV) conform to prior expectations that are based on summaries of the National Service scheme (Department of Labour
and National Service, various years; Langford, 1997).
For men who did not serve in the army (r ¼ 0), records
were synthesized using published population data (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008).8
8
Counts of 20-year-old men at June of each calendar year are published, subject to a definitional change in 1971 (see Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2008, for details). Within each single year of age, the proportion in a six-month birth cohort is assumed to equal the corresponding
proportion in the 2006 Census, after excluding migrants who arrived after
the age of 20. In practice, this proportion remains close to 0.5 (varying
from 0.49 to 0.51). Within each cohort, the proportion of men whose
DOBs were balloted-in is assumed to equal the proportion of DOBs balloted-in. Finally, the counts of army servicemen (taken from military personnel records) are subtracted from the total residents in each cohort and
ballot outcome status.
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TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Ballot outcome

First-stage database
Army service in Vietnam era (mean)
Army service in Vietnam (mean)
Days in Vietnam (mean for Vietnam army servicemen)
Army servicemen died in Vietnam (n)
N
Census 2006
Employed (mean)
Disability (mean)
Postschool qualifications (mean)
Tertiary qualifications (mean)
N
Personal income tax return database
2008–2009
Employed (mean)
Log earnings (mean)
N
1992–1993
Employed (mean)
Log earnings (mean)
N

The upper panel of table 1 shows descriptive statistics
from the first-stage data. The population consists of
868,605 men; 9.4% of them served in the army during the
Vietnam era, and 3.4% of them served in the army in Vietnam. Those who served in Vietnam spent an average of 261
days there. I do not have data on total time spent in the
army, although the terms of national service stipulated a
two-year commitment (which was reduced to 1.5 years in
1971). Of the army servicemen who served in Vietnam,
342, or 1.2%, died in Vietnam. Balloted-in men were much
more likely to serve in the army (27.1%) than those
balloted-out (3.2%). Similarly, they were much more like to
serve in Vietnam (8.8% compared to 1.5%).
B. Second-Stage (Outcomes) Data

As detailed below, several outcomes databases were constructed. Under the two-sample 2SLS procedure, it was not
necessary to link records between these databases or to the
first-stage database.
Census 2006. In 2006 for the first time, the Census of
Population and Housing collected DOBs from all respondents. The estimation population is the set of men born
from 1945 to 1952, excluding those who arrived in Australia after the age of 20. Noting that each variable in the
model is categorical, a unit record database was reconstructed from frequency tabulations of employment status
by cohort and ballot outcome. This covers every permutation of the variables in the second-stage regression.
There are 675,832 such men in the Census data, 22%
fewer than in the first-stage database. Contributing to this
attrition is mortality (9%), missing DOB in the Census
(approximately 10%), and Census undercount (approxi-

In

Out

All

.271
.088
269
218
224,706

.032
.015
249
124
643,899

261
342
868,605

.690
.060
.483
.151
175,348

.729
.048
.484
.152
500,484

.719
.051
.484
.152
675,832

.476
10.53
250,012

.499
10.55
722,263

.493
10.55
972,275

.683
10.23
261,135

.680
10.23
751,777

.681
10.23
1,012,912

.094
.034

mately 2%). The remaining 1% is presumably attributable
to outbound migration. Such attrition is a threat to validity
if it is correlated with ballot outcome. However, the existing evidence suggests that this is not a major threat. In the
Census data, men with balloted-in DOBs make up 25.9% of
the men in this age range, as compared to an expected
25.8% if the DOB frequency distribution were independent
of ballot outcome within each cohort. Thus, balloted-in
men are not disproportionately missing from the Census
data. Further evidence suggests that any excess mortality
among those balloted-in is likely to be small. Some 198
National Servicemen (176 of whom had balloted-in DOBs)
died in the Vietnam conflict. This represents around 0.3%
of national servicemen, or 1% of national servicemen who
served in Vietnam, or 0.02% of the study population. A
mortality analysis comparing national service veterans to
national service nonveterans (Wilson et al., 2005) implies a
similar number of (additional) postservice excess deaths.
Exploiting the conscription lotteries, Siminski and Ville
(2011) find no evidence of significantly elevated postservice mortality (1994–2007) associated with army service.
The middle panel of table 1 includes a descriptive summary of Census data. The employment rate for balloted-out
men is considerably higher than for balloted-in men. Similarly, the disability rate is higher among balloted-in men.
There is little difference in educational attainment by ballot
outcome.
Personal income tax data, 1993–2009. A supplementary second-stage database was constructed from the full set
of personal income tax return data for 1992–1993, 1995–
1996, 1999–2000, 2002–2003, 2005–2006 and 2008–2009.
Not all residents submit tax returns (Leigh, 2005), but
almost all employees do. Employees who had any tax with-
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TABLE 2.—FIRST-STAGE AND REDUCED-FORM ESTIMATES
Army Service (r)
One ballot outcome IV
Ballot outcome
Full set of 16 ballot outcome IVs
Ballot outcome, cohort 1
Ballot outcome, cohort 2
Ballot outcome, cohort 3
Ballot outcome, cohort 4
Ballot outcome, cohort 5
Ballot outcome, cohort 6
Ballot outcome, cohort 7
Ballot outcome, cohort 8
Ballot outcome, cohort 9
Ballot outcome, cohort 10
Ballot outcome, cohort 11
Ballot outcome, cohort 12
Ballot outcome, cohort 13
Ballot outcome, cohort 14
Ballot outcome, cohort 15
Ballot outcome, cohort 16
F-statistics for IVs
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-statistic
N

.2349***

Army Service in Vietnam (v)

Employed in 2006 (Census) (y)

(.0010)

.0715***

(.0006)

.0261***

(.0013)

(.0033)
.3267***
(.0038)
.3097***
(.0043)
.2811***
***
(.0043)
.2826
***
(.0040)
.2649
(.0044)
.2570***
(.0041)
.2662***
***
(.0047)
.2782
***
(.0039)
.2576
(.0049)
.2639***
(.0048)
.2487***
***
(.0040)
.2350
***
(.0033)
.2107
(.0034)
.1899***
(.0030)
.1275***
.0011
(.0015)
3,973
1,781
868,606

.1198***
.1183***
.1179***
.1382***
.1262***
.1350***
.1233***
.1111***
.0872***
.0605***
.0318***
.0061***
.0005
.0008
.0013**
.0002

(.0024)
(.0028)
(.0032)
(.0034)
(.0031)
(.0035)
(.0031)
(.0034)
(.0026)
(.0029)
(.0022)
(.0012)
(.0008)
(.0007)
(.0004)
(.0001)

.0457***
.0484***
.0575***
.0456***
.0415***
.0539***
.0414***
.0372***
.0259***
.0122*
.0143*
.0030
.0007
.0022
.0006
.0003

(.0052)
(.0055)
(.0058)
(.0056)
(.0053)
(.0057)
(.0053)
(.0057)
(.0050)
(.0057)
(.0056)
(.0047)
(.0042)
(.0042)
(.0041)
(.0042)

927
931
868,606

675,832

This table reports estimated effects of ballot outcome on the probability of army service, army service in Vietnam, and employment in 2006, respectively. All regressions also include a constant and fifteen cohort
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Cohort 1 is the oldest six-month birth cohort. The slight variation in these first-stage results from Siminski and Ville (2011) is due to the exclusion of men born on
the fifteenth of each month in Siminski and Ville (2011). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

held or were liable to pay tax are required to submit a tax
return, and the number of men in the database with positive
wage-and-salary income corresponds closely to data from
other sources.9
Nonresidents are excluded. Preliminary analysis revealed
slightly elevated counts of men with DOBs listed as January
1, July 1, or October 10 in each year, and they are also
excluded. When used to estimate employment effects, the
five youngest cohorts are also excluded to reduce noise,
because the employment effects are confined to the older
cohorts in the (higher-quality) Census database, as will be
shown. The results are not sensitive to these exclusions. For
men with no earnings, records are synthesized using published contemporaneous counts of resident males by age,
much like the construction of the first-stage database. Since
recent migrants cannot be identified or hence excluded from
this database, the first-stage database is adjusted accordingly when 2SLS effects are calculated using tax data.
The bottom panel of table 1 presents summary statistics
from the first and last years of these data. The share of men
with positive earnings differs little by ballot outcome in
1992–1993, but it is 2.3 percentage points lower for ballotedin men in 2008–2009. Mean log earnings in 1992–1993 are
10.23 regardless of ballot outcome. In 2008–2009, mean log
earnings are slightly higher among balloted-out men.
Veterans’ disability pension database. I constructed a
veterans’ disability pension database from frequency tabu9
For example, 642,253 men born between 1945 and 1952 reported
positive wages and salaries in 2001–2002 on their tax returns, compared
to the 631,358 men who worked for wages or salaries as estimated from
HILDA data. For 2005–2006, the counts are 576,477 (tax return data) and
531,237 (HILDA).

lations of administrative data from the DVA, combined
with resident population data, much as I did with the
income tax data described above. Appendix B (online) contains a detailed descriptive summary of trends in disability
pension receipt.
IV.

Results

A. First-Stage Results

Table 2 shows results from the first-stage regressions for r
and v. The upper panel is from the regressions with a singleballot outcome instrument. The ballot outcome is estimated
to have induced over 23% of balloted-in men into the army,
including over 7% into army service in Vietnam. The IVs
are strongly significant in both regressions, with
t-statistics of 245 and 117, respectively. Similarly, the IVs
are strongly significant in the overidentified models (lower
panel of table 2) as evidenced by the large F-statistics. The
coefficient of ballot outcome for the sixteenth cohort is close
to 0 and is not statistically significant in either first-stage
regression. This is sensible, because conscription was abolished in December 1972, shortly before men from the sixteenth cohort were due to be called up. For cohorts 13 to 15,
ballot outcome is a strong predictor of r but not of v. Similarly, for cohorts 9 to 11, ballot outcome is a much stronger
predictor of r than v relative to the first eight cohorts. This is
useful because it allows me to differentiate the effect of service in Australia from the effect of service in Vietnam.
The first-stage results imply that around 53,674 men were
induced by the ballot outcome to enlist in the army. The
number induced is 10,066 fewer than the total number of
national servicemen (63,740) (Langford, 1997). Compliers
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are a subset of national servicemen, because there was no
apparent incentive for balloted-in men to join the regular
army rather than wait call-up for national service, unlike
the U.S. experience (this is also evidenced by the insignificant coefficient of ballot outcome for cohort 16 in the army
service regression in table 2; see also note 5).
In section III, I argued that any correlation between mortality and ballot outcome is not large enough to be a substantial threat to the validity of the approach. I now consider
a related but more subtle issue, drawing on the first-stage
results. Veterans often have lower mortality rates than the
general population does because of preenlistment health
screening. Between 1966 and 2001, the mortality rate for
national servicemen was 27% lower than community norms
(Wilson et al., 2005). This suggests that compliers (both
balloted-in and balloted-out) account for a rising share of
each cohort over time, thereby increasing the size of the
ballot-outcome effects in the first stage. Consider men who
were 20 years old in 1965. Between 1965 and 2006, 11.6%
of them had died (my calculations from the AIHW National
Mortality Database). Extrapolating from Wilson et al.’s
estimates, the corresponding proportion of national servicemen who died after the Vietnam War is approximately
11.6% times 73% ¼ 8.5%. Compliers account for 32.7% of
the first birth cohort (see the coefficient of ballot outcome
for cohort 1 in the army service regression in table 2). By
2006, they probably account for roughly 32.7%  (1 
0.085)/(1  0.116) ¼ 33.8% of the surviving population.
Because death rates are lower for younger cohorts, the magnitude of this issue is smaller for younger cohorts. Given
the small magnitude of bias and in the interest of transparency and simplicity, no adjustments have been made.
The reduced-form employment regression shows that
ballot outcome is a significant negative determinant of
employment for each of the first 11 cohorts (table 2).
B. 2SLS Employment Effects (Census 2006)

Figure 1 shows 2SLS estimates of employment effect
separately for each cohort. The youngest cohort is omitted,
for whom ballot outcome is irrelevant in the first stage. The
upper panel shows that army service had a major negative
effect on the likelihood of employment, but only for some
cohorts. In particular, for cohorts in which no men were
induced to serve in Vietnam (those born in 1951 and 1952),
the effect of army service is close to 0, is not statistically
significant and is precisely estimated. This strongly suggests that the employment effect is confined to men who
served in Vietnam.
The lower panel of figure 1 shows corresponding estimates under the assumption that army service affected
employment only for those who went to Vietnam. The five
youngest cohorts are omitted because of the weakness in
their Vietnam service first stage. In the lower panel, there is
much less variation between cohorts, although the effect is
slightly larger for the first three cohorts. In these cohorts,

FIGURE 1.—2SLS EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS BY BIRTH COHORT (CENSUS 2006)

Vietnam veterans were age 60 or 61 and hence were eligible for a veterans’ age pension), while other men (civilians
of the same age, army veterans who did not serve in Vietnam, and younger Vietnam veterans) were not eligible for
any age pension. The estimates for the last two cohorts
shown are less precise, reflecting slightly weaker first
stages.
The upper panel of table 3 shows 2SLS estimates of
employment effects across cohorts. Columns 1 and 2 show
results from just-identified specifications, each with a single
endogenous variable and a single ballot-outcome instrument. Columns 3 to 7 show results from the overidentified
specifications that use the full set of 16 IVs. In columns 1
and 3, army service (r) is the sole endogenous regressor.
The estimated coefficient of r is .111 using one IV and
.120 with all sixteen IVs, with very small standard errors.
Thus, Vietnam-era army service reduced the employment
rate of compliers by 11 or 12 percentage points. In columns
2 and 4, army service is excluded from the model, replaced
with army service in Vietnam (v), which has an estimated
coefficient of .365 with one IV. With all 16 IVs, the point
estimate is almost unchanged at .366, but is more precise.
Thus, army service in Vietnam reduced the employment of
compliers who served in Vietnam by 37 percentage points,
under the assumption that the employment effect was 0 for
those who remained in Australia.
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TABLE 3.—2SLS ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS (CENSUS) AND VETERANS’ DISABILITY PENSION EFFECTS (2006)
Just-Identified Models
(1 Ballot Outcome IV)
Endogenous variables
Dependent variable: Employed in 2006
Army service (r)
Army service in Vietnam (v)

(1)

Overidentified Models Using All 16 IVs
(Ballot Outcome by Cohort)

(2)

(3)

.111***
(.005)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

***

.366
(.015)

.002
(.010)
.361***
(.029)

.001
(.010)
.341***
(.030)
.083**
(.032)

3.36
p ¼ 0.999

3.35
p ¼ 0.998

1.78
p > 0.999

.000
(.011)
.330***
(.035)
.078*
(.034)
.038
(.071)
1.72
p > 0.999

.498***
(.007)

.003
(.003)
.505***
(.010)

.004
(.003)
.498***
(.011)
.030*
(.014)

1.86
p > 0.999

1.84
p > 0.999

1.61
p > 0.999

.120***
(.005)
***

.365
(.018)

Army service in Vietnam interacted
with age >¼ 60 (vp)
Army service in Vietnam interacted with
combat intensity proxy (vx)
Overidentification test statistic

32.18
p ¼ 0.006

Dependent variable: receiving veterans’ disability pension (special rate) in 2006
Army service (r)
.148***
(.002)
Army service in Vietnam (v)
.488***
(.007)
Army service in Vietnam interacted
with age >¼ 60 (vp)
Army service in Vietnam interacted with
combat intensity proxy (vx)
Overidentification test statistic

.161***
(.002)

67.24
p < 0.001

.000
(.003)
.462***
(.013)
.013
(.015)
.136***
(.033)
0.69
p > 0.999

This table shows 2SLS estimates under various specifications. Each column corresponds to an employment regression (upper panel) and a disability pension regression (lower panel). A constant and fifteen cohort
dummies are included in each regression. The overidentification test is the grouped data test (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The test statistic has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
IVs minus the number of endogenous regressors—in this case, 15, 15, 14, 13, and 12 degrees of freedom for columns 3 to 7, respectively. N ¼ 675,832 in each employment regression and 777,201 in each disability
pension regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

The results in column 5 are for the specification in equation (1), where the coefficients of r and v are both identified.
The estimated coefficient of v is .361, which should now
be interpreted as the additional effect of service in Vietnam
(relative to the effect of serving only in Australia). The
coefficient of r is close to 0 and is not statistically significant, despite a small standard error, and so its inclusion has
almost no effect on the estimated coefficient of v. This suggests that the negative employment effect of army service is
manifest only among men who served in Vietnam. This is
consistent with the results in figure 1, which show no
employment effect for the cohorts in which conscripts were
not sent to Vietnam. Further, r is not statistically significant
in any of the other specifications that include v.
In column 6, I add the interaction of v and p (age eligibility for the veterans’ age pension), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is not surprising because it
represents the effect of eligibility for an early retirement
pension. What may be surprising is how small the effect is
(8.3 percentage points), suggesting that a clear majority
of Vietnam veterans who were induced to retire early
(before the civilian age pension age of 65) did so before
reaching the veterans’ age pension age (60 years). In this
specification, the coefficient of v is .341, which represents
the employment effect of service in Vietnam for those not
yet eligible for a veteran’s age pension.
In column 7, I add the combat intensity proxy (x), interacted with v. Other recent studies have used similar proxies
for combat intensity (Costa & Kahn, 2008; Rohlfs, 2010).
This variable is not statistically significant, but the estimate

is imprecise. The reliability of this proxy is questionable,
since there were relatively few deaths in most cohorts.
Further, the probability of death in Vietnam is highest for the
oldest cohorts, so it is difficult to know whether the variable
is picking up combat intensity or age-related heterogeneity.10 A better proxy would be based on combat injuries, not
deaths, but it is not available. A complete database of combat
injuries has been compiled (Fett et al., 1984), but it is unclear
whether it still exists, and if it does, its use by external
researchers is constrained by the Epidemiological Studies
(Confidentiality) Act 1981. A better measure of combat
intensity may warrant further research. However, it is clear
that there is actually little variation in employment effects
between cohorts if army service affected employment only
for those who went to Vietnam (lower panel, figure 1).
The overidentification test (table 3, column 3) confirms
that the army service local average treatment effects differ
between cohorts, which is consistent with the upper panel
of figure 1. For the other specifications (columns 4 to 7),
the overidentification tests show no evidence of heterogeneous average effects between cohorts.
A broad literature suggests that employment effects
should be larger for men with low potential earnings (see
10
Variations of this proxy also were tried (not shown), including versions that vary by ballot outcome and smoothed versions based on local
averages with adjacent cohorts. All led to imprecise estimates. Another
proxy considered was share of national servicemen serving in infantry
battalions, which had much higher casualty rates than other units. This
was also futile, because there is almost no variation between cohorts
(stable around 41%).
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Angrist et al., 2010; Autor & Duggan, 2003, 2006; Cai &
Gregory, 2004). That cannot be tested here because there
are no proxies for potential earnings available to interact
with the instruments in the first-stage data. I do find that the
share of the employment effect accounted for by low-skill
occupations (laborers and machinery operators and drivers)
is considerably larger than the share of employment in those
occupations (results available on request). But it is possible
that compliers were concentrated in those occupations to
begin with. This could be the result of either selection (highskill balloted-in men more likely to avoid enlistment) or a
causal effect of service. I find no evidence that army service
reduced average earnings (as shown later in this section).
But there are no data to test the selection argument. Men
with poor health and low intelligence were screened out in
the medical and aptitude tests. However, high-skill men may
have been more resourceful in avoiding conscription, and
they had a greater incentive to do so because of their potential earnings. So I cannot confidently determine whether the
employment effect is concentrated among low-skill men.
C. Veterans’ Disability Pension Effects

The lower panel of table 3 repeats the analysis, this time
with receipt of veterans’ DP-SR in 2006 as the dependent
variable. In most respects, the DP-SR effects mirror the
employment effects but are even larger. This suggests that
some compliers who receive DP-SR, and hence are not
employed, would remain not employed in the counterfactual (if they had been balloted-out) but would be ineligible
for DP-SR.
Like the employment effect, the DP-SR effect is confined
to men who served in Vietnam. There is some evidence that
the effects are larger for cohorts that experienced greater
combat intensity. As argued previously, however, this proxy
may be picking up age-related heterogeneity. There is little
or no effect of veterans’ age pension eligibility on DP-SR
receipt.
D. Employment and Veterans’ Disability Pension Effects
over Time

Table 4 shows corresponding 2SLS estimates of employment and veterans’ disability pension effects over time.
Since table 3 suggests that such effects are confined to men
who served in Vietnam, I now include army service in Vietnam as the sole endogenous regressor. The employment
effect from Census data in table 4 is taken directly from
table 3 (column 4), and the same specification is used
throughout table 4, changing only the dependent variable.
The discrepancy in the 2006 results using Census versus tax
data may reflect differences in the definition of being
employed, including the treatment of self-employment
(excluded from the tax data employment definition) and differences in the reference period (one week in the Census
compared to a full year in the tax data).

TABLE 4.—2SLS ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS AND VETERANS’ DISABILITY
PENSION EFFECTS, 1990–2009

Year
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2006
2009

Employment
Effect
(Census Data)
(1)

.366***

(.015)

Employment
Effect
(Tax Data)
(2)
.047***
.026
.037*
.116***
.208***
.235***

(.014)
(.014)
(.015)
(.016)
(.017)
(.017)

Disability
Pension
(SR) Effect
(3)
.017***
.038***
.101***
.204***
.347***
.498***
.570***

(.001)
(.002)
(.003)
(.004)
(.006)
(.007)
(.007)

This table shows 2SLS estimates of the effects of army service in Vietnam on employment or disability pension receipt at various points in time. Each estimate shown is from a separate regression. The specifications correspond to those shown for 2006 in column 4 of table 3. For column 2, 1993 represents the
1992–1993 tax year, similar to other years. Earlier data are not available at this time. Men with positive
earnings in a given tax year are counted as employed for the regressions using tax data. The last five
cohorts are excluded from the employment regressions using tax data. The discrepancy in the 2006
results using Census versus tax data may reflect differences in the definition of being employed, including the treatment of self-employment (excluded from the tax data employment definition) and differences
in the reference period (one week in the Census, as compared to a full year in the tax data). Disability
pension (SR) receipt is in June of each year. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05,
**
p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

The results from tax data suggest that the employment
effect emerged recently, beginning around the mid-1990s.
The estimates are negative and statistically significant for
each year from 1998–1999 to 2008–2009. They increase
(become more negative) steadily throughout the period.
The effect is largest for 2008–2009 at 23.5 percentage
points. For 1992–1993, the employment effect is actually
positive (4.7 percentage points) and significant. Undoubtedly some men were permanently unable to work immediately after being injured in Vietnam. However, their numbers are apparently too small to drive these results. There is
reason to be cautious in interpreting the positive effect for
1992–1993, given how small it is and a relative instability
in effect sizes between cohorts as compared to the Census
results (results by cohort are available on request). Nevertheless, the tax data suggest that the employment effect was
either small or 0 as recently as the mid-1990s.
DP-SR effects also increased strongly between 1990 and
2009, by a factor of over 33, from a very small base. The
similarity of trends in DP-SR effects and employment
effects, coupled with the results in table 3, strongly suggests
that the two are linked.
E. External Validity

Compliers are likely to have different characteristics
from men who joined the army voluntarily. Further, compliers were limited to army service, but other Vietnam
veterans served in all arms of the Defence Force. Excluding
compliers, 33% of Vietnam veterans in the same age groups
served in the navy and 8% served in the air force. Figure 2
shows the proportion of compliers and other veterans who
served in Vietnam who received the DP-SR over this period
(for simplicity, no adjustments are made for mortality).
The growth in DP-SR for other Vietnam veterans is very
similar to that of compliers. This is a strong indication
that the results have some external validity. The trends in
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TABLE 5.—2SLS ESTIMATES OF EARNINGS EFFECTS AND INCOME EFFECTS
Dependent Variable
Earnings in
1995–1996

Army service (r)
N

(1)

Log
(Earnings in
1995–1996)
(2)

Personal
Income
in 2006
(3)

Log (Personal
Income
in 2006)
(4)

319
(297)
697,487

.016
(.011)
697,487

598
(464)
650,185

.004
(.010)
633,904

This table shows 2SLS estimates of the effects of army service on annual earnings in 1995–1996
(using tax data) and on annual personal income in 2006 (using Census data). The samples are restricted
to observations with positive earnings (columns 1 and 2), nonmissing income (column 3), and positive
income (column 4). The specifications correspond to those shown in column 3 of table 3. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.

Population restricted to Vietnam veterans born between January 1, 1945, and June 30, 1950. Adjustments are not made for mortality, so all proportions are underestimates.

DP-SR take-up are not confined to conscripts or to army
servicemen.
F. Earnings and Income

How did the dramatic changes in employment and disability pension receipt affect compliers’ standard of living?
Using the same 2SLS procedure as above, I estimate the
effect of army service on income and earnings (table 5).
Army service (r) is the endogenous regressor, since there is
no reason to presume that these effects are confined to men
who served in Vietnam. I consider total personal income in
2006 using the Census (source of income is not available)
and earnings in 1996 tax data.11
For 1995–1996, I find no significant effect on earnings in
logs or in levels, although both point estimates are positive.
Thus, there is no evidence of an adverse effect of army service on mean earnings in 1995–1996. However, other
income sources, such as the veterans’ disability pension, are
not included.
Using equivalent specifications, I find no significant
effect on mean personal income in 2006.12 However,
income in the Census is reported before tax, and the veter11
As shown previously, the coverage of men with non-0 earnings is
very good in the tax data. However, the tax data are not reliable for studying income from all sources in the present context because many men
without earnings do not file tax returns. Given that there is no significant
employment effect in 1996, I assume that an analysis of earnings in 1996
is not subject to selection bias. A similar assumption is not appropriate
for other years.
12
Only categorical income data were collected in the Census, so
income is set to the midpoint of each category. The open-ended highest
category is set to $2,500 per week. The results are not sensitive to the
assumed value, because ballot outcome is found to be orthogonal to the
probability of having income in this category. However, the distribution
of income is heavily compressed among balloted-in men in 2006. The
probability of having income between $400 and $800 per week is much
higher (reduced form effect ¼ 0.022, SE 0.002) for balloted-in men. The
probability of having higher or lower incomes is correspondingly lower.

ans’ disability pension is not taxable. Although not conclusive, the results suggest that the effects on mean (after tax)
income likely were positive in both 1996 and 2006. But the
data do not reveal explicitly whether the reduction in earnings over this period was offset by the increase in transfers.
V.

Conclusion

Using unit record population data, I find huge negative
effects of army service on employment for Australia’s Vietnam veterans, effects that are confined to men who served
in Vietnam. These effects have emerged only in the past fifteen years, coinciding with even larger veterans’ disability
pension effects. I have shown evidence suggesting that the
effects are not confined to veterans who were induced to
enlist by the conscription ballots.
These results are consistent with aging-related exacerbation of service-related health conditions. However, comparable estimates of employment effects for the United States
are statistically insignificant and close to 0 (Angrist et al.,
2010, 2011). Differences in Australian and U.S. involvement in Vietnam are unlikely to explain this discrepancy:
considerably higher proportions of American soldiers serving in Vietnam were killed (1.7%) and wounded (8.9%),
as compared to their Australian counterparts (0.9% and
5.2%, respectively) (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,
2009; Wilson et al., 2005).
Thus, an explanation must be sought elsewhere. It has
been suggested that Australia’s system of veterans’ entitlements is among the most generous in the world (Clarke,
Riding, and Rosalky, 2003). Indeed, a far greater proportion
of Australia’s Vietnam veterans receives disability compensation than U.S. veterans. The ‘‘reverse criminal’’ standard
of proof for disability claims made by Australia veterans is
very generous (see Appendix B online). However, it seems
likely that the results are explained primarily by the central
role of employability in the Australian compensation system. There is a very large difference in the Australian disability pension payment rate between veterans who can and
cannot work that is not part of the U.S. system. A simple
policy change that might be worthy of further research is an
increase in the highest general veterans’ disability pension
rate to equal the DP-SR rate. This would not disadvantage
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any veteran but would greatly reduce the work disincentive.
I do not attempt to estimate the cost of such a reform, but I
note that DP-SR recipients far outnumber recipients of
100% general rate compensation. This is particularly the
case for Vietnam veterans, for whom the ratio is about 7:1,
but also for veterans of other conflicts except World War II.
A rough conservative estimate of the present value of lost
earnings for Vietnam veterans is $9.4 billion (AU$2010,
assuming a 5% discount rate), or over $240,000 per soldier
who served in Vietnam.13 No detrimental effects of army
service on mean income are found, so this loss in earnings
appears to have been fully compensated.
The Australian conscription lotteries provide a natural
experiment of the highest quality. Given the similarities of
Australian and U.S. culture and institutions, further comparative research is likely to be informative. In future work,
we aim to contribute to debates on the effects of army service on human capital accumulation and on other outcomes,
including crime and marital stability.
13
For this estimate, it is assumed that the employment effects estimated
for compliers also apply to other Vietnam veterans from the 1945–1952
birth cohorts. The estimate is based on the employment effects from Census data, the trends estimated using tax data, and male average weekly
earnings. Effects on older and younger Vietnam veterans, as well as possible effects prior to 1996 and after 2009, are excluded.
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APPENDIX
Draft Avoidance Behavior and the Exclusion Restriction
The ballot outcome was randomly assigned, but its validity as an
instrumental variable depends on the assumption that its only effect on
employment was via inducement of army service. Here I consider several
forms of draft avoidance behavior as potential violations of this assumption. I conclude that there is little reason for concern.
A. University Education and Apprenticeships
Balloted-in students, apprentices, and trainees were granted temporary
deferments of National Service liability (Langford, 1997). Prior to their
ballot, men thus had an incentive to enroll in a course of study or apprenticeship. Such actions occurred prior to the ballot and hence were orthogonal to ballot outcome. However, after their ballot, the balloted-in men who
had been granted temporary deferments had an incentive to continue their
studies rather than drop out because temporary deferments were reassessed
annually. If any such induced education improved long-run employment
prospects, then the validity of the IV is challenged. However, analysis of
Census data suggests this is not a significant issue. There is some evidence
that balloted-in men were slightly more likely to have post–high school
educational attainment (the reduced-form estimate is 0.004; p ¼ 0.013).
However, this effect appears to be confined to vocational qualifications
(diplomas and certificates), while the effect on degree or higher qualifications is not statistically significant. Further, there is a second potential
explanation for the slightly elevated attainment of vocational qualifications, which is not a threat to instrument validity: the postdischarge
national service vocational training scheme covered fees, travel expenses,
textbooks, and equipment, as well as a living allowance for those studying
full time. This may have raised the attainment of vocational qualifications.
It is possible to include education in the employment equation, but this has
not been pursued due to the weak education first stage. See Siminski &
Ville (2012) for a more detailed analysis of schooling effects.
B. Marriage
Men who were married at the time that call-up for their age group
commenced were granted indefinite deferment of National Service liability (Australian Government, 1966). Again, inducement of marriage prior
to the ballot is orthogonal to ballot outcome. However, it appears that
there was a small window of opportunity (approximately two to three
months) for men to marry after the ballot but before call-up. As an example, the first ballot was held on March 10, 1965. Most men were informed
of the outcome within two weeks, and call-up action began on May 31,
1965 (Australian Government, 1966). In later years, similar rules prevailed (see Department of Labour and National Service, 1971). This
appears to have allowed men to avoid conscription through marriage after
the ballot outcome was known. However, to my knowledge, no such concerns were raised at the time. The fact that the government policy on mar-

97

ried men did not change substantively over this period provides further
support for a lack of concern.
C. Health
Balloted-in men were not liable for call-up if they failed medical or
psychological examinations. The proportion of men who failed these
examinations increased during the period. It has been suggested that one
explanation for this is the availability of various tablets and medications
that helped men to fail the medical tests (Langford, 1997). If such actions
had long-run employment consequences for these men, then the exclusion
of ballot outcome from the employment equation is invalid. To my
knowledge, there is no evidence in the historical records of such concerns
being raised.
D. Noncompliance and Prison
One way in which men dissented and did not comply with the national
service obligation was to fail to register for the ballot. If detected, such
men were automatically liable for call-up, and most of them eventually
conformed with the requirements. Only fourteen men were imprisoned
for failing to comply with a call-up notice (Langford, 1997). At least
some of these men probably did not register for the ballot, so not all of
them would have had balloted-in birthdays. Thus, the ballot outcome had
a negligible effect on imprisonment among those who were not induced
into the army.
E. Leaving the Country or Going Underground
Other ways to avoid the draft included hiding or fleeing the country.
This represents a threat to validity if substantial numbers of men did so as
a result of being balloted-in or called up and if this affected their long-run
employment outcomes. In the United States, the practice of avoiding the
draft by moving to other countries such as Canada reportedly was widespread. This practice has not received substantial attention in the Australian literature, which suggests that it is less of an issue, presumably for
geographical reasons. A few examples of hiding or moving overseas are
given by Ham (2007), sourced from Langley (1992). It is also unclear
whether such actions were taken by men who failed to register or by those
balloted-in. The official history of Australia’s involvement states that
prior to 1968 ‘‘some young men were covertly evading service by devices
such as traveling to New Zealand’’ (Edwards, 1997, 217), but no reference is given for this claim. Amendments to the National Service Act
were made in 1968, which prevented airlines and shipping companies
from issuing tickets to men of conscription age without a departmental
certificate (Edwards, 1997).
F. Citizen Forces
As an alternative to facing the national service ballot, men could elect
to serve in the citizen forces (army, air force, or navy reserves) before
their ballot (Australian Government, 1966; Department of Labour and
National Service, 1966). As in the cases discussed previously, this is not a
threat to validity because the choice to join the citizen forces was made
prior to the ballot. However, there was a brief period (up to December 8,
1965) when balloted-out men could exploit a loophole. After finding out
they were balloted-out, these men could resign from the citizen forces.
The ballot outcome thus not only had the effect of inducing some men
into national service but also induced other men to stay in the citizen
forces. This is an issue only for the first two cohorts and only to the extent
that involvement in the citizen forces affected long-run employment outcomes. Further, at December 31, 1965, only 879 balloted-in men had their
liability deferred due to enlistment in the citizen forces (Australian Government, 1966), equal to 2.4% of men balloted-in in 1965. Thus, even for
the 1945 birth cohorts, this is a negligible issue.

